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Such justifications of oppression in the name of liberty are no mere products of the liberal imagination, for there are notorious historical examples of their endorsement by authoritarian political leaders.

Berlin, himself a liberal and writing during the cold war, was clearly moved by the way in which the apparently noble ideal of freedom as self-mastery or self-realization had been twisted and distorted by the totalitarian dictators of the twentieth century — most notably those of the Soviet Union — so as to claim that they, rather than the liberal West, were the true champions of freedom.

The slippery slope towards this paradoxical conclusion begins, according to Berlin, with the idea of a divided self. We can now enrich this story in a plausible way by adding that one of these selves — the keeper of appointments — is superior to the other: The higher self is the rational, reflecting self, the self that is capable of moral action and of taking responsibility for what she does.

This is the true self, for rational reflection and moral responsibility are the features of humans that mark them off from other animals.

The lower self, on the other hand, is the self of the passions, of unreflecting desires and irrational impulses. This allows them to say that by forcing people less rational than themselves to do the rational thing and thus to realize their true selves, they are in fact liberating them from their merely empirical desires.

The true interests of the individual are to be identified with the interests of this whole, and individuals can and should be coerced into fulfilling these interests, for they would not resist coercion if they were as rational and wise as their coercers.

Since one is free to the extent that one is externally unprevented from doing things, they say, one can be free to do what one does not desire to do.

A perfectly contented slave is perfectly free to realize all of her desires. Nevertheless, we tend to think of slavery as the opposite of freedom.

More generally, freedom is not to be confused with happiness, for in logical terms there is nothing to stop a free person from being unhappy or an unfree person from being happy.

The happy person might feel free, but whether they are free is another matter Day, Negative theorists of freedom therefore tend to say not that having freedom means being unprevented from doing as one desires, but that it means being unprevented from doing whatever one might desire to do Steiner Van Parijs ; Sugden Some theorists of positive freedom bite the bullet and say that the contented slave is indeed free — that in order to be free the individual must learn, not so much to dominate certain merely empirical desires, but to rid herself of them.

She must, in other words, remove as many of her desires as possible. One is to heal the wound. But if the cure is too difficult or uncertain, there is another method.

This is the strategy of liberation adopted by ascetics, stoics and Buddhist sages. But this state, even if it can be achieved, is not one that liberals would want to call one of freedom, for it again risks masking important forms of oppression.

It is, after all, often in coming to terms with excessive external limitations in society that individuals retreat into themselves, pretending to themselves that they do not really desire the worldly goods or pleasures they have been denied.

Moreover, the removal of desires may also be an effect of outside forces, such as brainwashing, which we should hardly want to call a realization of freedom.

Because the concept of negative freedom concentrates on the external sphere in which individuals interact, it seems to provide a better guarantee against the dangers of paternalism and authoritarianism perceived by Berlin.

To promote negative freedom is to promote the existence of a sphere of action within which the individual is sovereign, and within which she can pursue her own projects subject only to the constraint that she respect the spheres of others.

Humboldt and Mill, both advocates of negative freedom, compared the development of an individual to that of a plant: Personal growth is something that cannot be imposed from without, but must come from within the individual.

Critics, however, have objected that the ideal described by Humboldt and Mill looks much more like a positive concept of liberty than a negative one.

Positive liberty consists, they say, in exactly this growth of the individual: This is not liberty as the mere absence of obstacles, but liberty as autonomy or self-realization.

Why should the mere absence of state interference be thought to guarantee such growth? Is there not some third way between the extremes of totalitarianism and the minimal state of the classical liberals — some non-paternalist, non-authoritarian means by which positive liberty in the above sense can be actively promoted?

Much of the more recent work on positive liberty has been motivated by a dissatisfaction with the ideal of negative liberty combined with an awareness of the possible abuses of the positive concept so forcefully exposed by Berlin.

John Christman , , , for example, has argued that positive liberty concerns the ways in which desires are formed — whether as a result of rational reflection on all the options available, or as a result of pressure, manipulation or ignorance.

The promotion of positive freedom need not therefore involve the claim that there is only one right answer to the question of how a person should live, nor need it allow, or even be compatible with, a society forcing its members into given patterns of behavior.

Take the example of a Muslim woman who claims to espouse the fundamentalist doctrines generally followed by her family and the community in which she lives.

She is positively free, on the other hand, if she arrived at her desire to conform while aware of other reasonable options and she weighed and assessed these other options rationally.

Even if this woman seems to have a preference for subservient behavior, there is nothing necessarily freedom-enhancing or freedom-restricting about her having the desires she has, since freedom regards not the content of these desires but their mode of formation.

Liberals might criticize this on anti-paternalist grounds, objecting that such measures will require the state to use resources in ways that the supposedly heteronomous individuals, if left to themselves, might have chosen to spend in other ways.

Other theorists of liberty have remained closer to the negative concept but have attempted to go beyond it, saying that liberty is not merely the enjoyment of a sphere of non-interference but the enjoyment of certain conditions in which such non-interference is guaranteed see especially Pettit , , , and Skinner , These conditions may include the presence of a democratic constitution and a series of safeguards against a government wielding power arbitrarily, including the separation of powers and the exercise of civic virtues on the part of citizens.

As Berlin admits, on the negative view, I am free even if I live in a dictatorship just as long as the dictator happens, on a whim, not to interfere with me see also Hayek There is no necessary connection between negative liberty and any particular form of government.

On the alternative view sketched here, I am free only if I live in a society with the kinds of political institutions that guarantee the independence of each citizen from exercises of arbitrary power.

Republican freedom can be thought of as a kind of status: Freedom is not simply a matter of non-interference, for a slave may enjoy a great deal of non-interference at the whim of her master.

What makes her unfree is her status, such that she is permanently liable to interference of any kind. Contemporary republicans therefore claim that their view of freedom is quite distinct from the negative view of freedom.

Only arbitrary power is inimical to freedom, not power as such. On the other hand, republican freedom is also distinct from positive freedom as expounded and criticized by Berlin.

First, republican freedom does not consist in the activity of virtuous political participation; rather, that participation is seen as instrumentally related to freedom as non-domination.

Secondly, the republican concept of freedom cannot lead to anything like the oppressive consequences feared by Berlin, because it has a commitment to non-domination and to liberal-democratic institutions already built into it.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the republican concept of freedom is ultimately distinguishable from the negative concept, or whether republican writers on freedom have not simply provided good arguments to the effect that negative freedom is best promoted, on balance and over time , through certain kinds of political institutions rather than others.

While there is no necessary connection between negative liberty and democratic government, there may nevertheless be a strong empirical correlation between the two.

Ian Carter , , Matthew H. Kramer , , and Robert Goodin and Frank Jackson have argued, along these lines, that republican policies are best defended empirically on the basis of the standard negative ideal of freedom, rather than on the basis of a conceptual challenge to that ideal.

On this basis, people who can achieve their goals only by bowing and scraping to their masters must be seen as less free than people who can achieve those goals unconditionally.

Another important premise is that the extent to which a person is negatively free depends, in part, on the probability with which he or she will be constrained from performing future acts or act-combinations.

People who are subject to arbitrary power can be seen as less free in the negative sense even if they do not actually suffer interference, because the probability of their suffering constraints is always greater ceteris paribus , as a matter of empirical fact than it would be if they were not subject to that arbitrary power.

Much of the most recent literature on political and social freedom has concentrated on the above debate over the differences between the republican and liberal i.

Critiques of the republican conception that build on, or are otherwise sympathetic to, those of Carter and Kramer, can be found in Bruin , Lang and Shnayderman Pettit himself has continued to refine his position, and has further discussed its relation to that of Berlin Pettit Frank Lovett has developed an account of domination as a descriptive concept, and of justice as the minimization of domination Lovett Several other authors have made use of the concept of domination in addressing more specific problems in normative political theory, such as disability rights, workplace democracy, social equality, and education policy De Wispelaere and Casassas ; Breen and McBride Does this fact not denote the presence of some more basic agreement between the two sides?

How, after all, could they see their disagreement as one about the definition of liberty if they did not think of themselves as in some sense talking about the same thing?

In an influential article, the American legal philosopher Gerald MacCallum put forward the following answer: What the so-called negative and positive theorists disagree about is how this single concept of freedom should be interpreted.

MacCallum defines the basic concept of freedom — the concept on which everyone agrees — as follows: Freedom is therefore a triadic relation — that is, a relation between three things: Any statement about freedom or unfreedom can be translated into a statement of the above form by specifying what is free or unfree, from what it is free or unfree, and what it is free or unfree to do or become.

Any claim about the presence or absence of freedom in a given situation will therefore make certain assumptions about what counts as an agent, what counts as a constraint or limitation on freedom, and what counts as a purpose that the agent can be described as either free or unfree to carry out.

The definition of freedom as a triadic relation was first put forward in the seminal work of Felix Oppenheim in the s and 60s.

This interpretation of freedom remained, however, what Berlin would call a negative one. What MacCallum did was to generalize this triadic structure so that it would cover all possible claims about freedom, whether of the negative or the positive variety.

If, on the other hand, we say that the driver is unfree , what we shall probably mean is that an agent, consisting in a higher or rational self, is made unfree by internal, psychological constraints to carry out some rational, authentic or virtuous plan.

Notice that in both claims there is a negative element and a positive element: What these two camps differ over is the way in which one should interpret each of the three variables in the triadic freedom-relation.

More precisely, we can see that what they differ over is the extension to be assigned to each of the variables. Thus, those whom Berlin places in the negative camp typically conceive of the agent as having the same extension as that which it is generally given in ordinary discourse: Those in the so-called positive camp, on the other hand, often depart from the ordinary notion, in one sense imagining the agent as more extensive than in the ordinary notion, and in another sense imagining it as less extensive: The set of relevant purposes is less extensive for them than for the negative theorists, for we have seen that they tend to restrict the relevant set of actions or states to those that are rational, authentic or virtuous, whereas those in the negative camp tend to extend this variable so as to cover any action or state the agent might desire.

Indeed, as MacCallum says and as Berlin seems implicitly to admit, a number of classic authors cannot be placed unequivocally in one or the other of the two camps.

Locke, for example, is normally thought of as one of the fathers or classical liberalism and therefore as a staunch defender of the negative concept of freedom.

A number of contemporary libertarians have provided or assumed definitions of freedom that are similarly morally loaded e.

Nozick ; Rothbard Advocates of negative conceptions of freedom typically restrict the range of obstacles that count as constraints on freedom to those that are brought about by other agents.

For theorists who conceive of constraints on freedom in this way, I am unfree only to the extent that other people prevent me from doing certain things.

If I am incapacitated by natural causes — by a genetic handicap, say, or by a virus or by certain climatic conditions — I may be rendered unable to do certain things, but I am not, for that reason, rendered unfree to do them.

Thus, if you lock me in my house, I shall be both unable and unfree to leave. But if I am unable to leave because I suffer from a debilitating illness or because a snow drift has blocked my exit, I am nevertheless not unfree, to leave.

Unfreedom as mere inability is thought by such authors to be more the concern of engineers and medics than of political and social philosophers.

If I suffer from a natural or self-inflicted inability to do something, should we to say that I remain free to do it, or should we say that the inability removes my freedom to do it while nevertheless not implying that I am un free to do it?

Kramer endorses a trivalent conception according to which freedom is identified with ability and unfreedom is the prevention by others of outcomes that the agent would otherwise be able to bring about.

In attempting to distinguish between natural and social obstacles we shall inevitably come across gray areas. An important example is that of obstacles created by impersonal economic forces.

Do economic constraints like recession, poverty and unemployment merely incapacitate people, or do they also render them unfree?

Libertarians and egalitarians have provided contrasting answers to this question by appealing to different conceptions of constraints.

Thus, one way of answering the question is by taking an even more restrictive view of what counts as a constraint on freedom, so that only a subset of the set of obstacles brought about by other persons counts as a restriction of freedom: This last view has been taken by a number of market-oriented libertarians, including, most famously, Friedrich von Hayek , , according to whom freedom is the absence of coercion, where to be coerced is to be subject to the arbitrary will of another.

Notice the somewhat surprising similarity between this conception of freedom and the republican conception discussed earlier, in section 3.

This analysis of constraints helps to explain why socialists and egalitarians have tended to claim that the poor in a capitalist society are as such unfree, or that they are less free than the rich, whereas libertarians have tended to claim that the poor in a capitalist society are no less free than the rich.

Egalitarians typically though not always assume a broader notion than libertarians of what counts as a constraint on freedom. Important exceptions to this egalitarian tendency to broaden the relevant set of constraints include Waldron and Cohen , who demonstrate, for the sake of argument, that relative poverty is in fact empirically inseparable from, and indeed proportional to, the imposition of physical barriers by other agents, and Steiner , who grounds a left-libertarian theory of justice in the idea of an equal distribution of social freedom.

We have seen that advocates of a negative conception of freedom tend to count only obstacles that are external to the agent.

Such constraints can be caused in various ways: In the first case we have an internal constraint brought about by natural causes; in the second, an internal constraint intentionally imposed by another human agent.

A first dimension is that of the source of a constraint — in other words, what it is that brings about a constraint on freedom.

We have seen, for example, that some theorists include as constraints on freedom only obstacles brought about by human action, whereas others also include obstacles with a natural origin.

A second dimension is that of the type of constraint involved, where constraint-types include the types of internal constraint just mentioned, but also various types of constraint located outside the agent, such as physical barriers that render an action impossible, obstacles that render the performance of an action more or less difficult, and costs attached to the performance of a more or less difficult action.

The two dimensions of type and source are logically independent of one another. Given this independence, it is theoretically possible to combine a narrow view of what counts as a source of a constraint with a broad view of what types of obstacle count as unfreedom-generating constraints, or vice versa.

To illustrate the independence of the two dimensions of type and source, consider the case of the unorthodox libertarian Hillel Steiner —5, On the one hand, Steiner has a much broader view than Hayek of the possible sources of constraints on freedom: On the other hand, Steiner has an even narrower view than Hayek about what type of obstacle counts as a constraint on freedom: This does not make it impossible for you to refuse to hand over your money, only much less desirable for you to do so.

If you decide not to hand over the money, you will suffer the cost of being killed. That will count as a restriction of your freedom, because it will render physically impossible a great number of actions on your part.

But it is not the issuing of the threat that creates this unfreedom, and you are not unfree until the sanction described in the threat is carried out.

For this reason, Steiner excludes threats — and with them all other kinds of imposed costs — from the set of obstacles that count as freedom-restricting.

This conception of freedom derives from Hobbes Leviathan , chs. Many laws that are normally thought to restrict negative freedom do not physically prevent people from doing what is prohibited, but deter them from doing so by threatening punishment.

Are we to say, then, that these laws do not restrict the negative freedom of those who obey them? A solution to this problem may consist in saying that although a law against doing some action, x , does not remove the freedom to do x , it nevertheless renders physically impossible certain combinations of actions that include doing x and doing what would be precluded by the punishment.

The concept of overall freedom appears to play an important role both in everyday discourse and in contemporary political philosophy.

It is only recently, however, that philosophers have stopped concentrating exclusively on the meaning of a particular freedom — the freedom to do or become this or that particular thing — and have started asking whether we can also make sense of descriptive claims to the effect that one person or society is freer than another or of liberal normative claims to the effect that freedom should be maximized or that people should enjoy equal freedom or that they each have a right to a certain minimum level of freedom.

The literal meaningfulness of such claims depends on the possibility of gauging degrees of overall freedom, sometimes comparatively, sometimes absolutely.

Theorists disagree, however, about the importance of the notion of overall freedom. For some libertarian and liberal egalitarian theorists, freedom is valuable as such.

This suggests that more freedom is better than less at least ceteris paribus , and that freedom is one of those goods that a liberal society ought to distribute in a certain way among individuals.

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He had come to town many years before, a lawyer by profession. The stage was robbed on its way in by the local ruffian, Liberty Valance, and Stoddard has nothing to his name left save a few law books.

The territory is vying for Statehood and Stoddard is selected as a representative over Valance, who continues terrorizing the town.

When he destroys the local newspaper office and attacks the editor, Stoddard calls him out, though the conclusion is not quite as straightforward as legend would have it.

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